Kursk incursion, August 2024 – April 2025
Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, after seizing Crimea and backing armed groups in Donbas from 2014; the UN General Assembly deplored "the aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine" and demanded Russia's withdrawal (Resolution ES-11/1, 2 March 2022, 141 to 5). On 6 August 2024, two and a half years into that war, Ukraine carried the fighting across the border into Russia's Kursk Oblast. The surprise incursion took Sudzha and its gas metering station, cut the Seym bridges in Glushkovo district and, by Ukraine's claims, reached about 1,300 km² by late August, widely described as the first foreign occupation of Russian territory since World War II. Russia counterattacked from September with troops drawn from the front in Ukraine and, from late 2024, North Korean soldiers. After months of attrition, Russian forces cut the salient's supply road and, in March 2025, broke in from the north and retook Sudzha. Ukraine said the operation aimed to draw Russian units away from Donbas and to gain a bargaining position. Both sides' loss figures are claims. Ukraine's General Staff said on 6 January 2025 that Russia had lost about 38,000 troops in Kursk Oblast, about 15,000 of them killed, and that 860 had been captured; on 26 April 2025 it gave 62,400 Russian losses (25,200 killed), more than 4,500 North Korean losses and 983 captured. Russia's Defense Ministry claimed more than 76,000 Ukrainian losses (TASS, 26 April 2025). Neither side's figures can be verified. South Korean lawmakers briefed by the NIS said on 30 April 2025 that about 4,700 of some 15,000 North Korean soldiers deployed had been killed or wounded, about 600 of them killed. Lines on this map are approximate, drawn from ISW assessments and checked against DeepState.
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The battle, stage by stage
- 6 August 2024
Across the border
Early on 6 August 2024, Ukrainian forces crossed from Sumy Oblast into Russia's Kursk Oblast, the first large ground incursion into Russia in the war. ISW assessed that Ukraine achieved operational surprise: the border was held by a thin screen of conscripts, FSB border guards and Rosgvardia. Small armored groups pushed in on several axes, toward Sudzha from the Yunakivka direction, via Nikolayevo-Darino in the west, and toward Guyevo and Plekhovo in the south. Russian officials first put the force at about 300 troops and 11 tanks, a figure they later raised. Which brigades took part was not announced; Forbes identified the 80th Air Assault Brigade from vehicle footage, and a Russian-sourced list cited by OSW named the 80th and 82nd Air Assault and 22nd, 61st and 115th Mechanized Brigades. Axes are approximate. (Sources: ISW 8 Aug; OSW 14 Aug; Kyiv Post/Forbes.)
- 7–12 August 2024
The gas station and the deep raids
On 7 August footage showed Russian soldiers surrendering at the Sudzha gas metering station on the town's western edge, the point where Russian gas entered Ukraine's transit system for Europe; a Zelensky adviser told the Washington Post on 8 August that Ukrainian forces held it, and a video from the 61st Mechanized Brigade's 99th Battalion showed them there. Gas kept flowing, Gazprom said. Ukrainian groups were geolocated in northern Sudzha and pushed north toward Malaya Loknya, where Russian troops held out around the women's prison. ISW corroborated the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade fighting near Sudzha and Martynovka by 10 August. By OSW's reading, mobile groups reached the Kremyanoye–Sheptukhovka–Ivnitsa line, more than 20 km from the border, at midday on 12 August before being pushed back to about 15 km. Ukraine captured conscripts of the 488th and 1428th Regiments. (Sources: Meduza; Kyiv Independent; ISW 10 Aug; OSW.)
- 15 August 2024
Sudzha
On 15 August President Zelensky said Ukrainian forces held all of Sudzha, a town of about 5,000 before the war, the largest place they took. Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi claimed 1,150 km² and 82 settlements; DeepState's count was lower, and ISW mapped only observed activity, not control. Ukraine set up a military commandant's office for the area under Maj. Gen. Eduard Moskalyov and said it would open humanitarian corridors. The SBU said it captured 102 soldiers of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and Chechen 'Akhmat' units on 14 August (a Ukrainian claim). Russia named Alexei Dyumin to coordinate the response and began pulling units from inside Ukraine. Fighting continued north, east and southeast of the town. (Sources: Kyiv Independent; ISW 16 Aug; OSW.)
- 16–19 August 2024
The Seym bridges
West of the salient, Ukraine struck the bridges over the Seym River in Glushkovo [Hlushkovo] district, isolating the Russian forces south of the river. According to Ukraine's Air Force spokesman, GMLRS rockets holed the Glushkovo road bridge on 12–15 August and a guided bomb brought it down on 16 August (geolocated by ISW and Kyiv Post); a guided bomb on 16 August left the Zvannoye bridge damaged and impassable, and the Karyzh bridge was reported destroyed on 18–19 August, first by Russian military bloggers. Ukrainian strikes on the pontoon crossings that replaced them followed. Russian authorities warned that crossing south had become impossible, and civilians left by small boat. On the western flank DeepState reported Ukrainian forces in Snagost on 18 August. Bridge positions at Zvannoye and Karyzh are approximate. (Sources: ISW 16 Aug; Kyiv Post; Meduza 19 Aug; Euromaidan Press.)
- Late August 2024
The furthest extent
By late August the salient reached its widest. On 27 August Syrskyi claimed 1,294 km², 100 settlements and 594 prisoners. DeepState's maps put the peak at about 1,236 km² on 31 August counting the gray zone (about 900 km² held plus about 330 km² contested); ISW put the area of fighting at about 1,160 km².The encircled Russian troops at Malaya Loknya withdrew around 25 August. Korenevo stayed in Russian hands. ISW geolocated Ukrainian forces in Russkaya Konopelka east of Sudzha. Ukraine said it was creating a buffer zone, and Syrskyi said the aim included forcing Russia to move troops from the Pokrovsk sector. Lines are approximate and are not traced from any control map. (Sources: lb.ua/Kyiv Post; Ukrainska Pravda; Slovo i Dilo; Agentstvo via Euromaidan Press; ISW 23 Aug.)
- September–October 2024
The Russian counteroffensive
On 10 September Russia counterattacked the salient's western flank south of Korenevo. ISW visually confirmed the 51st VDV Regiment in a company-sized mechanized assault near Snagost, which Russia retook between 10 and 13 September; Russian sources also named the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade. Ukraine answered with a small cross-border attack south of Veseloye in Glushkovo district, about 3 km deep (ISW; position approximate). Russia stepped up the pressure in October: Ukraine held about 660 km² plus 360 km² of gray zone (Agentstvo, from DeepState's 13 October map), having lost about a quarter of its gains. Nine surrendered Ukrainian drone operators and contractors were executed in Kursk Oblast on 10 October, as alleged by DeepState and Ukrainian officials (not independently verified); Ukraine's Prosecutor General opened an investigation. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine later recorded 79 executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers in 24 incidents across the front since late August 2024. (Sources: ISW 11 & 13 Sept; Euromaidan Press; Al Jazeera; UN HRMMU.)
- November 2024 – January 2025
North Korean troops
North Korea sent troops to Russia in the autumn; the U.S. State Department said on 12 November that most of more than 10,000 had gone to the Kursk front. Russian military bloggers claimed Plekhovo, on the Psel at the salient's southeastern edge, was taken on 6 December with North Korean help; ISW could not verify this. In mid-December, by Forbes's account, about 500 North Korean soldiers made dense infantry assaults there; the Ukrainian journalist Andriy Tsaplienko, cited by Forbes, identified them as from the 92nd and 94th brigades. Ukrainian military intelligence reported more than 30 killed or wounded in one attack. On 5 January Ukraine attacked again from the Sudzha area, and ISW geolocated Ukrainian troops in southern Berdin. South Korea's NIS said North Korean troops had been out of combat since mid-January after heavy losses. Russia said it retook Nikolayevo-Darino on 27 January. By Slovo i Dilo's DeepState-based tally, Ukraine held about 640–670 km² in December and 605 km² in January, down from 925 km² at the end of October. Who held Plekhovo by late January is uncertain. Positions are approximate. (Sources: State Dept via Wikipedia; Forbes via Euromaidan Press; ISW 6 Jan; NIS; Moscow Times; Slovo i Dilo.)
- 1 February – 16 March 2025
Collapse and withdrawal from Sudzha
On 1 February a strike hit a boarding school in Sudzha sheltering civilians. Ukraine's Air Force said a Russian guided bomb killed four and seriously wounded four. Russia blamed a Ukrainian missile and gave no toll. A 2026 investigation by the Ukrainian rights group Truth Hounds attributed the strike to a Russian Su-34. On 6 February a Ukrainian push southeast of Sudzha advanced slightly along the 38K-028 Sudzha–Oboyan road and east of Fanaseyevka (ISW), but Russian drones and artillery were already reaching the H-07 road from Sudzha back to Yunakivka, the salient's main supply line. On 8 March Russia attacked from the north; pro-Kremlin bloggers said troops had walked about 15 km through the disused gas pipeline to emerge near Sudzha, which Ukraine's General Staff said it detected and struck (the route and numbers are unverified). Malaya Loknya and Martynovka fell on 8–10 March (DeepState, 9 March). Russian troops were filmed in central Sudzha on 12 March, Russia claimed the town on 13 March, and Ukraine's General Staff maps confirmed the withdrawal on 16 March. Syrskyi said saving soldiers' lives was the priority; troops left on foot and abandoned some vehicles (CIT). Ukraine denied it had been encircled. Russia said it retook Guyevo on 8 April. On 26 April Gerasimov told Putin that Russian forces had retaken Gornal, which he called the last Ukrainian-held settlement, and for the first time acknowledged North Korean troops' role. Ukraine's General Staff called this propaganda and said its units still held positions and were not encircled. (Sources: ISW 7 Feb & 8 Mar; Zmina; Moscow Times; AP; CIT; Meduza; Kyiv Independent; Al Jazeera.)
Forces
Ukraine attacked with a few thousand troops from a group that analysts put at 6,000 to 20,000, against a thin border screen; Russia answered by moving in some 30,000 troops by late August 2024, by Ukraine's count, and about 50,000 including North Koreans by November, by Zelensky's. Neither side published its strength; all figures are attributed estimates.
Russian forces, with North Korean troops from late 2024
IStories and Vyorstka counted 344 conscripts posted along the Kursk border in 2024, in some units 50 to 85 percent of the personnel. No figure for the FSB border guards or Rosgvardia was found. IStories and Vyorstka, 'What Happened to Russian Conscripts in Kursk in 2024 — and Afterwards' (August 2026); Novaya Gazeta Europe, 'At least 77 Russian conscripts were killed during Ukraine's Kursk incursion, investigation finds' (6 August 2026)
Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Russia had transferred some 30,000 troops to Kursk Oblast, 'and counting' (reported by John Hardie). A Ukrainian claim. John Hardie, 'Analysis: Russia moves forces to Kursk while intensifying push toward Pokrovsk', FDD's Long War Journal (30 August 2024)
President Zelensky said on 11 November 2024 that Ukrainian troops were holding off nearly 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops, a day after The New York Times reported Russia was massing 50,000 for an offensive. The Kyiv Independent, 'Ukraine holds off nearly 50,000 Russian troops in Kursk Oblast, Zelensky says' (11 November 2024)
A U.S. spokesman, Vedant Patel, said on 12 November 2024 that over 10,000 North Korean soldiers had been sent to eastern Russia and most had moved to Kursk Oblast; South Korea's NIS later estimated about 15,000 sent in total. The Kyiv Independent, 'US says North Korean troops join combat alongside Russia' (13 November 2024); Al Jazeera, 'About 600 North Korean soldiers killed in war in Ukraine, lawmakers say' (30 April 2025)
Ukrainian forces
OSW estimated on 12 August 2024 that 3,000 to 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers had entered Russian territory, part of a grouping of 6,000 to 10,000, built around four brigades. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 'Ukrainian attack on Kursk Oblast: military consequences and Ukraine's...' (12 August 2024)
John Hardie's assessment for FDD's Long War Journal (30 August 2024), drawing on the Wall Street Journal and The Economist. John Hardie, 'Analysis: Russia moves forces to Kursk while intensifying push toward Pokrovsk', FDD's Long War Journal (30 August 2024)
Ukraine did not announce its order of battle; a Russian-sourced list cited by OSW named these brigades, and Forbes identified the 80th from vehicle footage. Brigade names are as reported, not confirmed. Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW), 'The Ukrainian initiative in Kursk Oblast' (14 August 2024)
Casualties
The eight-month campaign cost both armies heavily, but every loss total is a claim by one side: Ukraine says Russia lost about 62,400 troops (25,200 killed) and 983 captured, Russia says Ukraine lost about 76,000, and South Korea's NIS said about 4,700 North Korean soldiers were killed or wounded. Neither side's figures can be verified; photo-verified counts show heavy equipment losses on both sides, and Russian officials report hundreds of civilian dead in Kursk Oblast. Certainty: poor.
Russian forces, with North Korean troops from late 2024
Ukraine's General Staff said after five months that Russian losses in Kursk Oblast exceeded 38,000, about 15,000 of them killed, and that Ukrainian forces had captured 860 soldiers. A Ukrainian government claim that cannot be verified; Russia published no figures of its own. Ukrinform, '5 months of Kursk operation: General Staff releases data on Russian losses in manpower, equipment' (6 January 2025); LIGA.net, 'General Staff: Ukrainian forces capture 860 Russians in five months in Kursk region' (6 January 2025)
Ukraine's General Staff gave these totals for the whole operation from 6 August 2024, on the day Russia declared the region retaken. A Ukrainian government claim that cannot be verified. Ukrinform, 'Russian army has lost 62,400 troops since start of Kursk operation - General Staff' (26 April 2025); Ukrainska Pravda (26 April 2025)
The exiled outlets IStories and Vyorstka confirmed the deaths of at least 77 of the conscripts posted on the Kursk border in 2024 from official data and obituaries; more than 30 were still missing in August 2026. The Ukrainian project 'I Want to Live' said about 500 captured conscripts had since been exchanged. This counts conscripts only, not the contract soldiers who fought later. IStories and Vyorstka, 'What Happened to Russian Conscripts in Kursk in 2024 — and Afterwards' (August 2026); Novaya Gazeta Europe, 'At least 77 Russian conscripts were killed during Ukraine's Kursk incursion, investigation finds' (6 August 2026)
South Korean lawmakers briefed by the National Intelligence Service said on 30 April 2025 that about 4,700 of some 15,000 North Korean soldiers sent to Russia had been killed or wounded, about 600 of them killed. Ukraine's General Staff put North Korean losses at more than 4,500 (26 April 2025); Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) later claimed more than 7,000. North Korea published nothing; none of these figures can be verified. Al Jazeera, 'About 600 North Korean soldiers killed in war in Ukraine, lawmakers say' (30 April 2025); Ukrinform, 'Russian army has lost 62,400 troops since start of Kursk operation - General Staff' (26 April 2025); The Kyiv Independent, 'Ukraine reveals new figures for North Korean troop losses in Russia's Kursk Oblast' (June 2026)
Ukrainian forces
Russia's Defense Ministry, as Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov reported the region retaken, claimed Ukraine had lost more than 76,550 troops in the Kursk area, without a breakdown into killed and wounded. Ukraine's General Staff called Gerasimov's statement propaganda. A Russian government claim that cannot be verified. TASS, 'Ukraine loses over 76,500 troops during incursion in Kursk area' (Russian Defense Ministry claim, 26 April 2025); Euromaidan Press, 'Ukraine's General Staff denies Kremlin's statement about withdrawal from Kursk Oblast' (26 April 2025)
Ukraine published no figure for its own losses in Kursk Oblast. The UA Losses project, an anonymous site that counts Ukrainian dead from obituaries (blocked in Ukraine, but judged credible by independent analysts, per EUobserver), says Ukraine lost 'thousands' there; its Kursk count could not be checked here. EUobserver, Tomáš Vasilko, 'Kursk and Krynky operations were disasters for Ukraine, new casualty figures show' (30 October 2026)
DeepState and Ukrainian officials alleged that nine surrendered Ukrainian drone operators and contractors were executed in Kursk Oblast on 10 October 2024; this was not independently verified, and Ukraine's Prosecutor General opened an investigation. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine recorded 79 executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers in 24 incidents across the whole front from late August 2024 (3 February 2025). Al Jazeera, 'Ukraine rights envoy urges response to alleged execution of captured troops' (13 October 2024); UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, alarming rise in executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers (3 February 2025)
Civilians
Russian officials' toll for civilians killed in Kursk Oblast since the incursion rose from 56 (Foreign Ministry envoy Rodion Miroshnik, September 2024) to 288 killed of 791 harmed (acting governor Alexander Khinshtein, citing Health Ministry data, April 2025) and at least 640 killed and 561 wounded (Investigative Committee, 6 August 2026). Officials did not explain their methods and Ukraine's Foreign Ministry said such claims cannot be verified. Russia's Investigative Committee also alleged that Ukrainian troops killed 22 civilians in Russkoye Porechnoye; Ukraine rejected this and the outlet Proekt said the case looked staged (Meduza). The Moscow Times, '2 years after Kursk incursion, Russia raises civilian death toll to more than 600' (6 August 2026); The Moscow Times / AFP, 'Russia says 288 civilians died in Ukraine's Kursk incursion' (30 April 2025); The Moscow Times, 'At least 56 Russians killed, 770 missing since Kursk incursion, officials say' (23 September 2024); Meduza, 'Counting Kursk's dead' (18 March 2025)
Oleksii Dmytrashkovskyi, spokesman for Ukraine's military administration in Kursk Oblast, said on 16 January 2025 that 112 civilians had died in the Ukrainian-held Sudzha district: 36 from Russian shelling, 40 of 'heart attacks', the rest unspecified. A Ukrainian official claim, not independently verified. Meduza, 'Counting Kursk's dead' (18 March 2025)
Journalists of the outlet 7x7 verified 30 civilian deaths by name as of March 2025 and called it a floor, not a full toll; a Kursk activist said the true number was 'not even 55', and the Kursk Red Cross spoke of 'several dozen' makeshift graves (Meduza). Meduza, 'Counting Kursk's dead' (18 March 2025)
A strike hit a boarding school in Ukrainian-held Sudzha that was sheltering civilians. Ukraine's Air Force said a Russian guided bomb killed four and seriously wounded four; a Kursk activist put the dead at six. Russia blamed a Ukrainian missile and gave no toll. A 2026 investigation by the Ukrainian rights group Truth Hounds attributed the strike to a Russian Su-34. Zmina, on the Truth Hounds investigation of the Sudzha boarding school strike (2026); The Moscow Times, 'Russia and Ukraine trade blame for attack on Kursk school' (2 February 2025); Meduza, 'Counting Kursk's dead' (18 March 2025)
Kursk governor Alexei Smirnov said 770 people were missing by 23 September 2024; Russia's human rights ombudswoman said in June 2026 that the fate of 320 civilians was still unknown. More than 150,000 people were ordered out of border communities (official figures, via The Moscow Times); official data cited by Meduza gave 112,000 displaced. The Moscow Times, 'At least 56 Russians killed, 770 missing since Kursk incursion, officials say' (23 September 2024); The Moscow Times, '2 years after Kursk incursion, Russia raises civilian death toll to more than 600' (6 August 2026); The Moscow Times, 'Ukrainian attacks are preventing return of displaced residents to Russia's Kursk region, governor says' (19 June 2025); Meduza, 'Counting Kursk's dead' (18 March 2025)
Equipment and ships
A contributor to the Oryx project counted losses in Kursk Oblast confirmed by photos and geolocation: 868 Ukrainian armored vehicles, guns and other equipment and 750 Russian. Photo counts are minimums and depend on what each side films. Digi24, citing an Oryx contributor's count of geolocated losses (9 April 2025)
Counts by the open-source tracker Naalsio covering Kursk Oblast and neighboring Sumy Oblast; WarSpotting recorded 53 Russian wrecks (8 tanks) by 9 September. Compiled by The Dupuy Institute. The Dupuy Institute, 'So what have the Russians lost around Sudzha?' (11 September 2024), citing WarSpotting and Naalsio
Ukraine's General Staff also claimed 1,104 motor vehicles, 12 multiple rocket launchers and 12 air defense systems destroyed. A Ukrainian government claim, not verified. Ukrinform, '5 months of Kursk operation: General Staff releases data on Russian losses in manpower, equipment' (6 January 2025)
Russia's Defense Ministry also claimed 2,297 armored combat vehicles and 2,803 motor vehicles. A Russian government claim, not verified; it is far above the photo-verified count. TASS, 'Ukraine loses over 76,500 troops during incursion in Kursk area' (Russian Defense Ministry claim, 26 April 2025)
The Conflict Intelligence Team said Ukrainian troops leaving Sudzha in March 2025 sometimes had to abandon equipment and walk out; it observed abandoned Abrams tanks, a Bradley, an M113, a Biber bridge layer, Humvees and a destroyed Bohdana howitzer. Conflict Intelligence Team, Dispatch, 10–14 March 2025
Then and now: how the ground has changed
The rolling farmland, woods and river valleys of the Seym and Psel are unchanged, but Sudzha and many border villages were heavily damaged and largely emptied: after Russia retook the town in March 2025 its district was still described as uninhabitable at the end of 2025. The Sudzha gas metering station, idle since transit through Ukraine ended on 1 January 2025, burned in March 2025, and the permanent Seym bridges in Glushkovo district were brought down in August 2024.
- Sudzha, a town of about 5,000 before the incursion, was held by Ukrainian forces from August 2024 until Russia retook it in March 2025; Ukraine's General Staff confirmed the withdrawal on 16 March. By then the town was reported 'greatly damaged', and Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrskyi said Russian air strikes had left it 'almost completely destroyed'. Source: Euronews, 'Ukraine loses Sudzha, the biggest town it had occupied in Russia's Kursk region' (16 March 2025); The Kyiv Independent, 'General Staff confirms withdrawal from Sudzha, Kursk Oblast' (16 March 2025)
- In December 2025 the head of Sudzha district, Alexei Spiridonov, asked the roughly 50 remaining residents to leave before winter; the district center and many villages were still uninhabitable, and demining and rebuilding had not begun (as reported from TASS by Govorit NeMoskva). Source: Govorit NeMoskva, citing TASS: authorities ask residents to leave Sudzha district (18 December 2025)
- Russian law enforcement put property damage in Kursk Oblast at 505 billion rubles across 186 towns and villages, with at least 53 cultural heritage sites damaged; residents of Korenevo, Sudzha and other settlements were still seeking replacement housing in late 2025. Russian official figures, not independently checked. Source: The Moscow Times, '2 years after Kursk incursion, Russia raises civilian death toll to more than 600' (6 August 2026); The Moscow Times, 'Kursk residents still paying taxes on property destroyed by war' (31 October 2025)
- More than 150,000 people were ordered out of the border districts; in June 2025 acting governor Alexander Khinshtein said residents would return only when there was no longer any threat from drones and shelling. Source: The Moscow Times, 'Ukrainian attacks are preventing return of displaced residents to Russia's Kursk region, governor says' (19 June 2025)
- The Sudzha gas metering station, on the town's western outskirts at Zaoleshenka, was the entry point for Russian gas into Ukraine's transit system; it changed hands in August 2024 while gas kept flowing. Transit ended when the Russia-Ukraine transit deal expired on 1 January 2025, and the station has not operated since. Source: Meduza, 'Ukraine just captured a key piece of pipeline infrastructure in Russia. So why is gas still flowing?' (9 August 2024); Novaya Gazeta Europe, 'Russia and Ukraine trade blame as Sudzha gas metering station comes under fresh attack' (28 March 2025)
- The station caught fire after an attack late on 20 March 2025 and was hit again about a week later; Russia's Defense Ministry said Ukrainian HIMARS strikes 'practically destroyed' it, while Ukraine's General Staff and Center for Countering Disinformation blamed Russian shelling. The extent of the damage and who caused it have not been independently established. Source: Novaya Gazeta Europe, 'Moscow and Kyiv trade blame as attack on Sudzha gas metering station causes major fire' (21 March 2025); Novaya Gazeta Europe, 'Russia and Ukraine trade blame as Sudzha gas metering station comes under fresh attack' (28 March 2025)
- Ukrainian strikes brought down the three permanent bridges over the Seym in Glushkovo district between 16 and 19 August 2024: the Glushkovo road bridge collapsed on 16 August, the Zvannoye bridge was left impassable, and the Karyzh bridge was reported destroyed on 18–19 August. Russia replaced them with pontoon crossings, at least four by late August according to satellite imagery analyzed by RFE/RL; Ukraine struck several of them. We found no reliable report of the permanent bridges having been rebuilt since. Source: The Moscow Times, 'Ukrainian army destroys bridge in Russia's Kursk region' (16 August 2024); IStories, 'The last bridge in Glushkovsky district destroyed' (19 August 2024); Kyiv Post, 'Ukraine Takes Down Third River Bridge, Cuts Off Russian Forces' (19 August 2024); Euromaidan Press, citing RFE/RL's Mark Krutov, 'Russia constructs fourth pontoon bridge across Seym River in Kursk Oblast, satellite imagery shows' (28 August 2024)
Weapons
Paintings and photographs
Free for everyone every year on its anniversary: August 6.
Accuracy score: 64/100 (moderate)
- Sources27/40
ISW/CTP daily assessments, OSW, the Conflict Intelligence Team, DeepState-based tallies and named journalism (Kyiv Post, Meduza, Kyiv Independent, AP, Al Jazeera); no scholarly reconstruction yet.
- Fixed points19/30
Towns, villages and the Seym bridges from published coordinates and geolocation; the gas metering station, Martynovka and the Glushkovo crossing are approximate.
- Movement detail11/20
Axes and dates follow ISW and DeepState; unit blocks are at axis level and front lines are schematic, not traced from control maps.
- Corroboration7/10
Sudzha, the Seym bridges and the March collapse are confirmed by two or more of ISW, DeepState and geolocation; North Korean details rest on fewer sources.
Sources and method
- Institute for the Study of War and AEI Critical Threats, Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments: 8 Aug 2024, 10 Aug, 16 Aug, 23 Aug, 11 Sept, 7 Feb 2025, 8 Mar 2025.
- Center for Eastern Studies (OSW), The Ukrainian initiative in Kursk Oblast, 14 Aug 2024.
- DeepStateMap.live (deepstatemap.live), area figures as reported by Slovo i Dilo and by Agentstvo via Euromaidan Press; Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap).
- Conflict Intelligence Team, Dispatch, 10–14 March 2025.
- Kyiv Post open-source analysis of the Seym bridges, 19 Aug 2024; Forbes via Kyiv Post (brigade identification).
- Meduza, the Sudzha gas metering station (9 Aug 2024) and the withdrawal from Sudzha (12 Mar 2025).
- The Kyiv Independent: Sudzha captured, the Gazprom facility, General Staff confirms withdrawal.
- Associated Press via PBS NewsHour (pipeline attack, 9 Mar 2025).
- Forbes via Euromaidan Press (North Korean assaults at Plekhovo); South Korea's NIS via Euromaidan Press and Al Jazeera.
- Al Jazeera, alleged execution of nine Ukrainian POWs (13 Oct 2024) and Russia's claim of 26 April 2025; UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, alarming rise in executions of captured Ukrainian soldiers (3 Feb 2025).
- Euromaidan Press, Glushkovo district attack (14 Sept 2024); The Moscow Times, Nikolayevo-Darino and Guyevo (8 Apr 2025).
- Loss figures: Ukraine's General Staff via LIGA.net (6 Jan 2025) and Ukrainska Pravda (26 Apr 2025); Euromaidan Press (General Staff denial, 26 Apr 2025); Syrskyi's 27 Aug 2024 claim via Ukrainska Pravda.
- Sudzha boarding school strike: Zmina (Truth Hounds investigation); The Moscow Times (2 Feb 2025).
- Karyzh bridge: Meduza, 19 Aug 2024.
- Plekhovo location: Visnyk NANU.
- Ukrainian claims: Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi and President Zelensky (territory, settlements, prisoners); Russian claims: Ministry of Defense and Chief of General Staff Gerasimov (recaptures). All are attributed as claims.
- Settlement coordinates: Wikipedia articles for each village (coordinates only) and Mapcarta.
Where the positions come from
- Settlements Town and village coordinates from Wikipedia, GeoNames-derived gazetteers and Visnyk NANU.
- Geolocation Bridge strikes from Kyiv Post open-source work; the gas station from Kyiv Independent/Meduza; approximate.
Further reading
- Analysis Russian Offensive Campaign Assessments (Aug 2024 – Mar 2025) — Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats
- Analysis The Ukrainian initiative in Kursk Oblast — OSW Centre for Eastern Studies (14 Aug 2024)
- Open-source analysis Dispatch, 10–14 March 2025 — Conflict Intelligence Team
- Data A year of the Kursk operation (area infographic) — Slovo i Dilo, from DeepState
- Official Ukraine: alarming rise in executions of captured Ukrainian military personnel — UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine